What is Called Cheating?
Heidegger, Commercial Surveillance, and Schooling

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ABSTRACT
The authors examine the functions of online proctoring services during the COVID-19 pandemic. Cheating itself is then examined using a four-part question from Martin Heidegger’s lecture What is Called Thinking? Aspects of this analysis include the historical conceptions of cheating and the environmental factors that lead to cheating. The authors determine that cheating is a response to the inauthenticity of schooling, as well as to the anxiety that accompanies modern conceptions of time. They conclude that learning is the existential call of responsibility for one’s being, and that a re-conception of education based on Heidegger’s conception of being and time would negate the incentives to cheat.

KEYWORDS
Heidegger; cheating; technology; ontology.
Introduction

At the end of the 2020 academic school year, a few months into the COVID-19 pandemic, the New York Times conducted a survey of students’ reactions to taking tests at home using online proctors. One student responded that, during in-person tests, she felt uncomfortable when the teacher “loomed over” her desk, and that the idea of a watchful webcam was similarly disquieting. Another pointed out that most online tests are taken on personal computers, and that giving permission to a teacher or a private proctor to monitor their screen constituted an invasion of privacy (The Learning Network, 2020). Similarly, Hussein, et al., found that students who took virtually proctored tests were uneasy with the idea of a person peering at them through their webcam, and that they would prefer an automated A.I. (artificial intelligence) proctor (2020). Students expressed anxiety, however, about the security of any videos that may be recorded by the automated proctor during testing (Hussein, 2020, 509-525).

Although online testing and monitoring has existed long before stay-at-home pandemic mandates, their use has increased with the rise of virtual schooling. Developed by companies such as ProctorU, Examsoft, and Honorlock, virtual testing software offers proctoring tools ensuring “compliance” and a “culture of fairness.” These companies claim that their software will allow universities to maintain academic integrity and degree legitimacy, specifically for online programs or classes (“Academic Solutions,” n.d.). Universities can use this software to verify the identity of test takers, detect environmental noise, track eye movement, gauge lighting, record keystrokes and mouse movements, and lock down browsers to prevent web surfing (“Platform,” n.d.). Furthermore, online proctoring companies also claim that their services will help universities reduce physical testing infrastructure, implement flexible test scheduling, create a level playing field for all students, and offload burdensome grading and proctoring duties from professors to the software (“Faculty,” n.d.). Given the increasing prevalence of these technological monitoring services, we examine their claims as part of a larger inquiry into cheating itself.

Though virtual proctoring companies offer multiple services, we focus on cheating prevention and cheating in general. Our analysis of the rhetoric used by these companies suggests that curbing student misconduct is central to their aim. Proctorio, for example, stresses “integrity,” while asserting that their data can “track test-takers over the length of their academic careers and even assign suspicion ratings” to individual students (“Analytics,” n.d.). Similarly, ProctorU’s website features the marketing phrase “deter. detect. prevent.” in boldface and with a subheading that urges users to “validate knowledge” (ProctorU, n.d.). These claims suggest that the education “market” has created a demand for software programs that monitor and ostensibly decrease academic dishonesty.

We clarify what cheating is before evaluating the utility of software programs claiming to reduce it. To clarify cheating, we use a modified version of the four-part question Martin
Heidegger poses in his lecture series “What is Called Thinking?” In these lectures, Heidegger poses the following four questions:

- What is called thinking?
- What is historically/traditionally understood by thinking?
- What is needed in order to think?
- What calls on us to think? (Heidegger, 2004, 113-114)

For the purposes of this paper, the questions are reformulated to address the topic of academic dishonesty:

- What is called cheating?
- What is historically/traditionally understood by cheating?
- What is needed in order to cheat?
- What calls on us to cheat?

**What is Called Thinking? What is Called Cheating?**

By asking the question, *what is called thinking?* Heidegger suggests that thinking, like cheating, has not been sufficiently defined. He argues that modern thinking has been instrumentalized by technological efficiency. Thinking has thereby been deprived of any human character, which, Heidegger explains, consists in “taking to heart” the being of beings. Heidegger’s point is not to answer the specific question “What is called thinking?” “On the contrary,” he writes, “one thing and one thing only matters with this question: to make the question problematical” (Heidegger, 2004, 159). To problematize the question, Heidegger decouples all presuppositions from the concept of thinking to begin anew down the path that leads to the “most precursory step.” He begins by explaining what thinking is *not*:

- Thinking does not bring knowledge as do the sciences.
- Thinking does not produce usable practical wisdom.
- Thinking solves no cosmic riddles.
- Thinking does not endow us directly with the power to act. (Heidegger, 2004, 159)

If Heidegger’s conception of thinking is not intended to accomplish the four tasks listed above, then what is left for it? Rather than providing tangible bits of knowledge, thinking itself is a *pointing*; it is a *way*. The path Heidegger wishes us to intellectually tread constitutes thinking itself. We can answer the call to think only by remaining on this path, by remaining “underway.” So, the answer to the question *what is called thinking?* is dispositional rather than definitional; it is heeding the call to think. Significantly, for Heidegger, the “most thought-provoking” idea “is that we are still not thinking” (Heidegger, 2004, 6). What Heidegger means by this claim is that we are too busy answering the questions of science and technology and, therefore, *not actually thinking*. Said differently, we are preoccupied by what we are told thinking is—scientism, utility, formulaic logic—that limits our capacity to think, *simpliciter*.

We borrow from Heidegger’s critique of thinking a parallel critique of cheating (though this parallel is not exact, we find Heidegger’s framework useful for addressing the problem of
Accordingly, we analyze the concept of cheating in the context of academic work in schools and universities. The question *what does academia call cheating?* is examined through institutional academic dishonesty policies, historical interpretations of cheating, and etymological origins of the word “cheating” itself. As with Heidegger, the goal is to question presuppositions about what is called cheating to examine more closely the reasons why universities use commercial proctoring and monitoring technologies (Zaveri & Philipps, 2020). We argue that online proctoring software is a symptom of a deeper, *enframed* ontological disposition, which conceptualizes cheating in a way that can only exist in places where thinking, of the sort Heidegger advocates, does not exist.

**What is Called Cheating (in Academia)?**

We use Harvard University and the University of Georgia (UGA) as examples in which academic dishonesty policies are easily located and clearly stated on their websites. In terms of plagiarism, Harvard states that “All work submitted for credit is expected to be the student’s own work. In the preparation of all papers and other written work, students should distinguish their own ideas and knowledge from information derived from other sources” (“Academic Integrity,” n.d.). The policy explains that students are responsible for learning and using the correct format for citations. UGA provides a similar definition of plagiarism in their student handbook, defining it as “Submission for academic advancement the words, ideas, opinions, or theories of another that are not common knowledge, without appropriate attribution to that other person” (“Culture of Honesty,” n.d.).

Regarding exam infractions, Harvard states that “Students may not communicate during an examination and no student is permitted to keep books or papers during an examination except with the express permission of the instructor or proctor. Eating and drinking are not permitted in any exam room” (“Academic Integrity,” n.d.). The definition provided by UGA also focuses on unauthorized communication or assistance during examinations. “During examinations,” they write, “...students are to assume that any assistance is unauthorized unless it has been specifically authorized by an instructor” (“Culture of Honesty,” n.d.). They clarify that prohibited behavior includes copying answers, receiving external aid to answer questions, submitting work that is not the students own, or using prohibited tools such as a calculator during an exam.¹

Historically, definitions of student misconduct have been fluid. In a paper on the history of academic integrity, Tricia Bertram Gallant details the ways in which universities have changed their conceptions of cheating over time, corresponding to changes in law, the economy, and technology (2008). In the Antebellum period, for example, Gallant explains the prevalence of cheating as a result of an adversarial relationship between teachers and students, created by pedagogical routines, strict rules, and frequent exams. Under these circumstances, the first

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¹ Much like “being,” without the presence of what is present, science would be nothing. In cheating, without the specific enframed conception of what learning is, the suspicion and cheating concept would be nothing.
honor codes were created by students to protect themselves from the perceived transgressions of the faculty. Honor in this context, according to Gallant, determined familial social standing, and was worth preserving at all costs. Loyalty to other students and to family was more important than obeying institutional commands. Within this understanding of honor, cheating could be rationalized as a necessary preservation method, and a bulwark against arbitrary academic policies. Gallant explains that factors such as the Copyright Act of 1909, an increased focus on publishing, and the commercialization of higher education led to institution-created honor codes to instill academic integrity and institutional loyalty among the student population. These fluctuations indicate that perceptions of academic dishonesty are shaped by historical trends and institutional actors.

Where we have examined the history of academic structures to gain a better understanding of cheating, Heidegger employs philology to gain pre-scientific clues into the historical nature of thinking. He traces the history of the word “think” back to the Old English word “thanc,” which means “the gathered, all-gathering thinking that recalls” (Heidegger, 2004, 139). This “thanc” is “imbued with the original nature of memory” as well as “thanks,” meaning the “thanks owed for being” (Heidegger, 2004, 141). The lineage of the word “think,” then, stems from a historical usage that encompassed a meaning much broader and more complex than the current conception, which Heidegger claims is an “impoverishment” brought on by analytic philosophy. Similarly, the etymology of the verb “to cheat” descends from the Old French word escheat, which literally means “that which falls to one,” in the legal sense of the ownership of property “falling” to the State after the death of a property owner with no immediate heir. Escheat, in turn, comes from the Latin excadere, which means “fall away, fall out” (“Cheat,” n.d.). The significance of this history will become clear in the next section.

What is Needed in Order to Cheat (in Academia)?

The third question asks about us, and what Dasein\(^2\) needs to answer the call to think. Heidegger clarifies question three as: “What is needed for us to accomplish thinking with essential rightness?” (Heidegger, 2004, 114). This, he explains, is a two-part question. The first part asks about the essential aspects of thinking such that its “rightness” can be accomplished. The second asks whether these essential aspects belong to us, are attainable by us, or are already within us by virtue of asking the question at all. In our formulation of the question, substituting the verb “to cheat” asks about the environmental and existential conditions that determine cheating. In an historical analysis of academic dishonesty, James M. Lang explicates these conditions using historical case studies of cheating. Lang infers that cheating is predictable when the following four conditions are present in any educational environment:

- Extrinsic motivation
- Performance-oriented classrooms
- High stakes

\(^2\) Dasein is Heidegger’s conception of the type of being of human beings, roughly translated as “being-there.”
• Low self-efficacy. (Lang, 2013, 55-128)

By *extrinsic motivation*, Lang means any learning that is motivated by something external to the student. Examples include rewards for success or appeals to future monetary compensation. *Performance-oriented classrooms* are those environments which emphasize specific instances of student behavior that are taken as the absence or proof of learning. For example, like Olympic athletes, students often train for months by participating in classroom activities, learning content, and completing benchmark assessments. When the judgment of this learning hinges on a performative exam at the conclusion of this training period, Lang argues, the conditions for cheating ripen. These conditions are exacerbated when the stakes of performative exams are high, increasing the negative consequences of failure as well as the positive outcomes of success. The final factor in Lang’s formula is *low self-efficacy*, or students’ lack of confidence in their own academic capabilities (Lang, 2013, 55-128). These four factors together constitute an environment in which students are deprived of autonomy due to the “covering over” of the path of thinking. Cheating is therefore a rational, if itself inauthentic, response to inauthenticity.

Lang redirects the focus on cheating from the individual to the social. In Heideggerian terms, our interactions with other people are a constitutive element of our being (Heidegger, 2010). All human actions, in other words, condition and are conditioned by already-existing meaning structures, things, and people. Other people (*Dasein-with*) are therefore an existential prerequisite for cheating. The methods and conditions by which cheating is carried out are contingent upon, even necessitated by, *Dasein’s* being-in-the-world. Any definition of plagiarism, for example, involves interacting with the work of other people. Similarly, cheating on exams is defined as receiving “unauthorized assistance,” usually from other people or from tools, which necessarily requires collaboration or interaction with an other.

Recalling the etymology of the verb “to cheat” further clarifies the environmentally contingent nature of the phenomenon. *Escheat*, to cheat in Old French, means “to fall away,” in the context of property reverting to state ownership after the previous owner dies with no heir. This original conception conjures images of unfair confiscation, and the overreach of state authority; images of being *cheated out of* something. But “falling” is rarely an intentional act. “I have fallen,” for example, implies an accident that potentially resulted in harm. Similarly, a dying person does not intentionally deprive their loved ones of valuable property. So where does the feeling of intentional violation in *escheat* originate? This violation originates from the same ontological place that constitutes the prerequisite of cheating: other people; human construction. By using the term *escheat*, “to fall away,” in the context of property deprivation by the state, the unintentional implication of “to fall” is covered over. Perhaps a more appropriate term would be “to deprive,” which more clearly implicates an intentional actor. That “to fall” was historically utilized in this way, however, is significant, for it points to the way in which contingent constructions seem to become inevitable. Using “to fall” disappears The
State into the background of consciousness, transforming it from an overreaching authority into a neutral entity.

How might the modern usage of “to cheat” mirror its etymological root? There are multiple angles from which this connection can be analyzed. First, in a student-centered approach, the person doing the depriving is the student, assuming the role of the State. The student, as the cheater, is “depriving” something from either the institution or any victim of plagiarism whose work was stolen. Instead of land, in the case of the university, there is a sense in which reputation is being deprived. Universities, when featured in high-profile news stories due to cheating scandals, are forced to publicly account for the incident to preserve their institutional reputation (Seipel, 2015; Platoff, 2015; Feron, 1976; Browne, 2020; LaGrone, 2014; McGee, 2020; Dinich, 2009; Schmitt, 1994; Greene, 2012; Fox, 2005; Miller, 2020; Schermel, 2020; Quigley, 2006; “College Announces Investigation,” 2012; “3 Face Expulsion,” 2016). The implementation of neoliberal education policies has amplified the attention given to cheating scandals due to increases in tuition and profit, as well as scrutiny over job placement statistics. In the case of the author whose work was plagiarized, the property that was taken is represented by the original work. The original author is “cheated” out of potential profits or recognition. This conceptualization reverses the original construction of escheat in that the entity being cheated is the one with social power, while the entity doing the cheating is the one with little or no social power.

A second interpretation in which the modern usage of “cheating” mirrors the historical is environment-oriented. This orientation preserves the original implication of escheat, placing the university in the position of depriver, whereas the student becomes the deprived. Here, the property expropriated is represented by the educational value that the student expects to receive from the university. The actions of students in this frame are contextualized within networks of social pressure that influence decision-making. As argued by Lang, if learning is characterized by extrinsic motivation, then students see no value in learning itself. The purpose becomes achieving the goal imposed by the university, which obscures the “path” of thinking, diverting the student’s attention away from assuming their own existential responsibility. In a culture that imposes superficial ends, then, cheating merely conforms to the prevailing logic. The lottery, for example, represents a potential path to cheat daily toil to attain lifelong monetary stability. Credit cards offer us the ability to circumvent even the acquisition of money. Here, there is a similar “deprivation,” an act of volition that, in its everydayness, becomes invisible. The problem within education is merely a subset of a larger problem that encompasses all of society, in other words. Where in this formula are students expected to value thinking itself, whatever thinking may be? The structure of education suggests that we are conditioned to conceptualize thinking as a means to some other end. If the goal can be obtained without the “meaningless” process of thinking, then circumventing this process (cheating) is rational. In this way, institutions become cheaters, barring the Heideggerian path of thinking.
What Calls on Us to Cheat?

Lang’s explanation of cheating details the immediate factors that influence humans to cheat. Cheating is therefore both a social act and a rational act. Yet Heidegger’s question, “what calls on us to cheat?”, does not ask about “what it is that gives us the impetus to think on each occasion and with regard to a particular matter,” which is precisely what our analysis has thus far done with cheating (Heidegger, 2004, 115). The final and most decisive question instead asks “what is it that directs us into thought, and gives us directions for thinking?” (Heidegger, 2004, 115). Heidegger explains that what “directs us to think gives us directions in such a way that we first become capable of thinking, and thus are as thinkers, only by virtue of its directive” (Heidegger, 2004, 115). So what calls us to think is constitutive for our thinking as such. Is it possible that cheating has a similar, constitutive call?

As noted above, Heidegger traces the etymology of the verb “to think” back to the historical word Thanc, which he relates to the concepts of memory and giving thanks. From this, he derives a conception of thinking as a taking-to-heart, a gathering together (Heidegger, 2004, 231). Heidegger explains this new conception by using a translated quote from Parmenides: “useful is the letting-lie-before-us, so (the) [sic] taking-to-heart, too: beings in being” (Heidegger, 2004, 228). Heidegger searched for answers in the pre-Socratic Greek era because, he claims, Plato’s interpretation of thinking and being was reductionistic, setting thinking and philosophy on the narrow path of formal logic. By separating corporeal beings from ideal being (Forms), Plato broke with Parmenides’ conception of being as the presence of beings, thereby precluding the possibility that humans can experience being as such (Keppler, 2001). This separation is analogous to what universities have done by placing the thing to be strived for outside of and after learning. Instead of thinking about what is most near to us, the being of beings, humans are entangled in the everydayness of objectified means and ends (Keppler, 2001). We take this to represent a form of the Heideggerian “disburdening,” the phenomenon in which Dasein offloads its decision-making onto external structures to avoid the anxiety that accompanies responsibility (Wrathall, 2006, 56). In the context of technological neoliberalism, this means that humanity is superficialized, rationalized only in our animal, rather than human existence (Heidegger, 2008, 226). As though only vulgar utilitarian decisions were worthwhile, humanity itself is rendered merely a means towards the end of economic growth. Such alienation from being robs us of our “memory,” defined as “the human recall of what must be thought about...the ‘keeping’ of what is most thought provoking” (Heidegger, 2004). In this way, the Western metaphysical tradition hides being, focusing our intellectual energy on false rationalistic certitude, which culminates in scientism. Instead, the duality of “beings in being” is what Heidegger wishes us to take-to-heart (to think), prior to any theorizing. Maria Majorie R. Purino explains that Heidegger’s goal is to cut beneath our symbolically-constructed existence to “wonder at the very fact that there is something,” rather than “wonder at the nature of things” (2017, 163). What calls us to think, in other words, is the duality of “beings in being.” Being also calls us to cheat, particularly when an authentic being-present-in-being is obscured.
Cheating, then, is a response in two senses of the word, one as a response to the university, and the other as a response to the call of being. Cheating as a response to institutional demands is inauthentic, because the response and what is responded to are already entangled in the inauthenticity of neoliberal and technological objectification. The call of being, however, cannot be inauthentic, precisely because it is the call of being. In cheating, students are grasping for some thing that is supposed to exist after, and external to, formal education. This thing, for Heidegger, is constitutive of the concern we have for our own being as a result of anxiety over our own finitude and the nothingness that pervades the periphery of our existence (Heidegger, 2008, 89-111). This anxiety is precisely what prompts the covering-over of being by everydayness. The path toward thinking is covered over, and the tools we have for clearing the way (cheating, for example) are inauthentic and reinforce the barrier to thinking (Heidegger, 2004, 84). How are we to get underway, then? Is it possible, in an age of inauthenticity, to think? What would an education oriented towards the “being of beings” look like?

**Setting Upon the Problem**

Heidegger explains that “science itself does not think, and cannot think” (Heidegger, 2004, 8). Furthermore, according to Heidegger, Western society is and has been characterized by scientific, enframed “one-track thinking” which covers over the “essence of things” (Heidegger, 2004, 34). If Dasein is a pointing towards being, how is it that we have found ourselves in a situation in which being is so covered over and hidden? How has Dasein missed what is most near? Heidegger suggests that we were drawn into such a situation and abandoned within it “by That which withdraws from us” (Heidegger, 2004, 35). That is, we are drawn by the very thing that calls and that must be thought about, the being of beings, if thinking is to be had or done at all.

The entanglement in “representational thinking,” in other words, is a result of an inauthentic response by Dasein to the authentic call of being. The first part of *What is Called Thinking?* explains this with an evaluation of Nietzsche’s proclamation that “the spirit of revenge...has so far been the subject of man’s best reflection” (Heidegger, 2004, 85). This “revenge” of which Nietzsche speaks is the revulsion against the “it was,” the passed time that is abhorrent to the will which, “being what it is, always wills forward” (Heidegger, 2004, 92). Because of this revulsion against what is permanently past, humanity’s thinking “sets upon everything it sets before itself, in order to depose and decompose it,” reducing it to scientific
explanations and neat categories. “This well made-up and well staged manner of forming ideas,” Heidegger writes, “dissimulates and blocks from view what really is” (Heidegger, 2004, 73).  

The desire to control and “depose” everything that we encounter, which originates in our revulsion against the uncontrollable passage of time, characterizes the attempts by schools and universities to standardize, monitor, and calculate every aspect of learning, including students and faculty. It represents a response to the call of being that is enslaved to existential revenge and the revulsion of what is permanently in the past. Cheating, too, is a response to the call of being, albeit one that is also enslaved to revenge against the “it was.” Implicit in this inauthentic response, however, is the clue to where the deliverance from revenge lies. Early in Heidegger’s first lecture, he established that the very thing that calls us to think is always already in a state of turning away, or withdrawing from Dasein, even as it draws us towards itself. In describing the withdrawal of That which must be thought about, Heidegger reminds us that “withdrawing is not nothing” (Heidegger, 2004, 9). Instead, withdrawing is an “event.” “In fact,” he continues, “what withdraws may even concern and claim man more essentially than anything present that strikes and touches him” (Heidegger, 2004, 9). In other words, the fact that the being of beings withdraws (or turns away) from us is evidence of the fact that we are pointing towards it and following its trail. Similarly, an inauthentic response to the call, such as cheating (and deposing), is not “nothing.” It is rather an event, a sign. By attempting to circumvent the one-track thinking that is demanded by the university, students are reaching for the Absolute Thing which has been set outside and external to learning, to be obtained at the end of the journey of education. Cheating therefore is a sort of facing-towards what is, towards being. Yet in this vengeful facing-towards, Heidegger explains, we “oppose[s] everything that is and as it is” (Heidegger, 2004, 84). Because of the “it was,” which is constitutive of being and time, we are repulsed when we face being. This is the source of the “revenge” of which Nietzsche speaks. Because our facing-towards is mired in revenge (and therefore instrumentalized), we have only a narrow and inauthentic set of options with which to respond to That which is faced. However, in Heidegger’s mantra that we are “not yet” or “still not” thinking, he reminds us that we are already underway. Cheating, as well as institutional instrumentalization, is an indicator that we are on the path to thinking the being of beings, however far from the destination we may be. This “event” that is an indicator for being underway is proof that, despite being enframed within a neoliberal technological existence, a way out remains open.  

In his analysis of Nietzsche, Heidegger is careful to remind us that Nietzsche is operating within a specific Western metaphysical tradition, which is operative not only for Nietzsche but for Western society in general. As previously noted, Plato (and here Heidegger traces Platonic metaphysics through the history of Western philosophy) separated Being from beings and conceived of being as eternal, independent of time. Time is grounded in, and therefore

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6 Heidegger uses the example of a face-to-face encounter with a tree in a meadow. “While science records the brain currents, what becomes of the tree in bloom?”, 42.
subordinate to, being. Heidegger, however, grounds being in time, albeit a “time of such a nature as we could never surmise, let alone think, with the help of the traditional time concept” (Heidegger, 2004, 103). By grounding being in time, being becomes the presence of what is present. Furthermore, eternity, instead of being removed from time, is inseparable from time because it is the “present ‘now’” (Heidegger, 2004, 103). This explanation of being and time reveals what Nietzsche’s revenge is actually repulsed by: not against “mere passing,” but “against that passing away which allows what has passed to be only in the past” (Heidegger, 2004, 103). Deliverance from the permanence of time’s passage is therefore a necessary step towards deliverance from the vulgar utilitarian way of being that is engendered by “revenge.”

**Thinking, not Cheating, the Indivisible Problem**

In our analysis of virtual proctoring software, we have sparingly mentioned the software itself, and instead have focused on the realm of metaphysical revenge. In fact, our argument is aimed at proctoring of all kinds, and to education/schooling in general. The focus of our investigation has intentionally not been on technology, per se, because, as Heidegger frequently repeats, “the essence of technology is above all not anything technological” (Heidegger, 2004, 22). ProctorU, Examsoft, and HonorLock are therefore problematic for reasons beyond their business models. Technology’s essence lies rather in “what from the beginning and before all else gives food for thought” (Heidegger, 2004, 22). This essence is the being of beings, or the presence of what is present, specifically within the context of the Western metaphysical tradition.

Following Heidegger’s thought requires us to treat matters as a whole. Heidegger’s biographer, Rudiger Safranski, explains that, like algae, Dasein is an indivisible whole such that attempting to “pull up” a part of it inevitably results in uprooting and gazing upon its entire existence (Safranski, 1998, 154). Analyzing cheating and invasive proctoring software ontologically therefore leads us to the conclusion that addressing the symptom, either by eliminating cheating or by eliminating the use of virtual proctoring software, is insufficient to rid ourselves of the root cause of the problem. This deeper problem is much more difficult to think through, let alone attempt to solve. We are, however, by virtue of our “still not,” already on the path towards thinking the problem. The remainder of the paper will be devoted to such thinking.

Earlier, cheating was defined historically as “to fall away.” We noted, however, that this meaning hid the underlying power relations between the State and its subjects. To describe the phenomenon more accurately, we began using the word “deprive.” In modern usage, “deprive” means “to give up, rob, divest, exclude...” (Barnhart, 2011, 267). It descends from the Latin deprivare, which breaks down into de-, meaning “entirely,” and -privare, meaning “release from” (Barnhart, 2011, 267). Privare is also related to the word “private,” which descends from the Latin Privatus, which means “to set apart from public life” (Barnhart, 2011, 841). “To deprive,” then, means as much as “to entirely set apart from public life.” This is significant because modern schooling totally privatizes, depriving students of public life. One example is
the physical infrastructure of schooling. Schools are self-contained environments that are spatially (and intellectually?) removed from involvement in the community (Boyles, 2011, 433-450). Another way in which educational institutions deprive students of public life is by conceptualizing and assessing learning in a way that totally individualizes. As we indicated, university codes of conduct explicitly proscribe community at precisely the time when learning is to be evaluated, negating the meaning of communal learning that took place prior to the performative assessment. Cheating, in the sense of universities depriving students of authentic educational experiences, is also a sort of “setting apart from public life.” Heidegger points out that Nietzsche labeled modern humans the “Last Man” because we are “no longer able to look beyond” ourselves (Heidegger, 2004, 57). Said differently, for every individual modern human, they are themselves the “last person,” the ultimate individual that, through revenge, rules and objectifies everything it encounters for itself. Education qua schooling, as we have shown, plays a crucial role in the creation of this individuated “Last Person.”

What is needed, then, is to un-privatize Dasein. This is qualitatively different from the “Fall” into the inauthentic “publicness” of the They, which is a loose collection of monads each objectifying what it encounters. This type of “everyday” publicness is characterized by “idle chatter” and “busyness” that is always already “looking for the next thing,” rather than lingering within the “matter in question” (Heidegger, 2010, 331). In order to allow ourselves to linger, it is necessary to go “beyond” ourselves, “to that nature by which [we] can overcome [our] former nature” (Heidegger, 2004, 59). This nature is illuminated by Parmenides’ phrase: “Useful is the letting-lie-before-us, so (the) taking-to-heart, too: beings in being” (Heidegger, 2004, 228). “to give thought to the Being of beings, and that is first of all to pay it heed” (Heidegger, 2004, 235).

The busyness and “idle chatter” of everyday publicness is endemic to modern American schooling. For example, a Georgia English-Language Arts standard requires students to “demonstrate knowledge” of “foundational works” of literature. This standard is listed between sections on “craft and structure” and on the proficiency expectations of students by grade twelve (“English Language Arts,” n.d., 10). Similarly, a biology standard directs students to “Obtain, evaluate, and communicate information to assess the interdependence of all organisms on one another and their environment,” including sub-standards that specify activities such as arranging components on a food web, comparing energy quantities, and explaining the cyclical nature of biochemical elements (“Biology Standards,” n.d., 4). These standards reduce beings to mandated data that exist to be manipulated and arranged. Furthermore, the classroom implementation of these standards will be accompanied by pacing

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7 As in the expression “preparing students for the real world,” which is evidently somewhere other than the school building.
8 Because of “tracking” and separation by grade and class period, along with rules about when students can and can’t communicate with each other, the interior of the building itself is also totally individualized. Additionally, the meaning of the concept “public” is contorted by neoliberal discourse for the purpose of advancing privatization.
guides, grades, standardized testing, and tracking, all of which further alienate students from the beings that have become objects to memorize, as well as from authentic community with each other. Amidst this busyness, what happens to the literature itself? What about the unnamed “organisms” that are evaluated and obtained? What sort of authentic community is possible in an environment that enforces artificial and mediated relationships? In an un-privatized and authentic educational environment, these encounters would be relational and “face-to-face,” though not necessarily in the literal sense (Heidegger, 2004, 42). In other words, students would be able to appreciate and “linger” with beings and with each other, without the inauthentic need to objectify, instrumentalize, or cover over. Encounters such as these are what Heidegger is referring to when he describes thinking as a thanking, as “the gathered, all-gathering thinking that recalls,” and as a “taking-to-heart.” This pre-scientific relation represents the deliverance from Nietzsche’s revenge, uncovering a path out of technologically enframed neoliberal existence. Revenge is against the “it was” in time, and this was the root of humanity’s desire to control and subdue beings in their being. Heidegger wishes us to step onto the “firm soil” of a new metaphysical conception of time in which eternity is the “now” of relational presence in the letting-lie-before-us and taking-to-heart of beings in being. Accordingly, the root cause of instrumentalized existence is collapsed if Dasein is de-privatized into the keeping of the eternal present. The inclinations which lead to virtual proctoring software, as well as cheating, would be non-existent.

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